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OPINION OF THE COURT 
______________ 
 
 
SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
 
 David Sikkelee died in a plane crash, and his wife, 
Plaintiff Jill Sikkelee, brought state-law strict liability and 
negligence claims against the engine’s manufacturer, AVCO 
Corporation, and its Textron Lycoming Reciprocating Engine 
Division (“Lycoming”), among other defendants.  Sikkelee 
alleges that the engine has a design defect.  We previously held 
that Sikkelee’s state-law claims are not barred based on the 
doctrine of field preemption, but we remanded to allow the 
District Court to consider whether they are barred under 
conflict preemption.  Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive Corp. 
(Sikkelee II), 822 F.3d 680 (3d Cir. 2016), cert. denied, AVCO 
Corp. v. Sikkelee, 137 S. Ct. 495 (2016).  The District Court 
concluded the claims are conflict-preempted and that, even if 
they were not, Lycoming is entitled to summary judgment on 
Sikkelee’s strict liability and negligence claims based on 
Pennsylvania law.  Sikkelee v. AVCO Corp. (Sikkelee III), 268 
5 
F. Supp. 3d 660 (M.D. Pa. 2017).  The Court also revisited an 
earlier ruling and granted summary judgment in favor of 
Lycoming on Sikkelee’s claim that Lycoming violated 14 
C.F.R. § 21.3 because it failed to notify the Federal Aviation 
Administration (“FAA”) of the alleged defect.  Sikkelee v. 
AVCO Corp. (Sikkelee IV), No. 4:07-CV-00886, 2017 WL 
3310953 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 3, 2017).   
 
 We conclude that the District Court erred in concluding 
Sikkelee’s claims are conflict-preempted because Lycoming 
has not produced clear evidence that the FAA would not have 
allowed it to change the engine’s design as set forth in the type 
certificate.  The Court also erred in granting Lycoming 
summary judgment on Sikkelee’s strict liability and negligence 
claims because there are genuine disputes of material fact 
concerning, among other things, causation.  However, it 
properly granted summary judgment on her failure-to-notify-
the-FAA claim.  Thus, we will reverse the Court’s order 
granting summary judgment on conflict-preemption and state-
law grounds, affirm its order granting Lycoming’s motion for 
reconsideration on the failure-to-notify claim, and remand for 
further proceedings.   
 
I 
 
A1 
 
 In July 2005, David Sikkelee was piloting a Cessna 
172N aircraft (the “Cessna” or “aircraft”) when it crashed 
                                                                
1 Because the parties do not dispute the relevant factual, 
statutory, or regulatory backgrounds, we draw largely from our 
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shortly after taking off from Transylvania County Airport in 
Brevard, North Carolina.  He was killed in the crash.  At that 
time, the aircraft had a Textron Lycoming O-320-D2C engine 
(the “engine”).  Sikkelee alleges the aircraft lost power and 
crashed due to a defect in the design of the engine and its 
carburetor—which, when working properly, regulates the 
mixture of fuel and air entering the engine’s cylinders.   
 
 In 1966, the FAA issued Lycoming a type certificate for 
the engine.  A type certificate certifies that the design of the 
aircraft or its part performs properly and satisfies federal 
aviation regulations.  Lycoming’s engine’s type certificate 
included approval of an MA-4SPA carburetor, which was 
manufactured by a different company, Marvel-Schebler.  The 
MA-4SPA carburetor consists of two halves—the float bowl, 
on bottom, which contains fuel, and the throttle body, on top, 
which meters the flow of air and fuel to the cylinders—and the 
two halves are joined by four hex-head bolts and lock-tab 
washers.  The FAA initially required safety wire to be used to 
prevent the bolts on MA-4SPA carburetors from loosening.  29 
Fed. Reg. 16,317, 16,318 (Dec. 5, 1964).  Lycoming asked the 
agency to remove that requirement and instead allow the use 
of hex screws and lock tabs, and the agency permitted it to do 
so.  Lycoming implemented the change with an engineering 
change order, which was signed by Lycoming’s Designated 
Engineering Representative (“DER”).2  The company 
                                                                
prior opinion in this case, Sikkelee II, 822 F.3d 680, and the 
District Court’s opinion, Sikkelee III, 268 F. Supp. 3d 660.   
2 The FAA may delegate to certain qualified persons—
designated engineering representatives (“DERs”)—the 
authority to conduct examinations, testing, and inspections 
necessary to issue a certificate, and to issue a certificate.  49 
7 
subsequently included the lock tab washer in its design and 
maintenance instructions.   
 
 Lycoming manufactured the engine at issue here in 
1969 in Pennsylvania and shipped it to an aircraft company in 
England the same year.  At that time, it was equipped with a 
Marvel-Schebler MA-4SPA carburetor.   
 
 Lycoming has been aware the carburetor’s screws were 
not completely effective in holding together the float bowl and 
throttle body.  The FAA sent Lycoming a letter in 1971, listing 
sixteen incidents of the screws on the Marvel-Schebler 
                                                                
U.S.C. § 44702(d)(1); see 14 C.F.R. §§ 183.1, 183.13, 183.15, 
183.29 (designation of DERs and termination of such 
designation); FAA Order 8110.37F, Designated Engineering 
Representative (DER) Handbook (2017); see also Steenholdt 
v. FAA, 314 F.3d 633, 634-35 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (discussing 
appointment and designation of DERs and the FAA’s oversight 
of DERs).  DERs are typically members of the private sector 
and employees of aircraft manufacturers, see United States v. 
S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig 
Airlines), 467 U.S. 797, 807 (1984); FAA, Order 8110.37F, at 
2-1 to 2-2, but their specific roles, authorizations, and 
responsibilities are established by agreement between the DER 
and the FAA office responsible for supervising the DER, FAA, 
Order 8110.37F, at 2-2, app. C at C-1.  In determining whether 
a manufacturer meets the requirements for a type certificate, a 
DER must follow the same procedures an FAA engineer must 
follow.  See 14 C.F.R. § 183.29(e); FAA, Order 8110.37F, at 
2-1.  DERs may approve minor design changes and, if 
specifically authorized, also may approve major changes.  
FAA, Order 8110.37F, at 2-2, 4-4; see infra at 19. 
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carburetor loosening.  The FAA sent another letter in 1972 
referring to these incidents again and met with Lycoming 
representatives to advise the company that reports of loosening 
screws were still being received.  Indeed, by that time, the FAA 
had forwarded to Lycoming forty-five “Malfunction or Defect 
Reports on this subject.”  App. 557.  The agency requested 
Lycoming to “review these reports and provide comments to 
this office as to any action you may propose that will help in 
alleviating this problem.”  Id.  The same year, the FAA also 
issued a memorandum stating that “Marvel Schebler 
carburetors are a part of the engine type design and are not 
approved separately.  The type certificate holder is responsible 
for the type design and also the correction of service 
problems.”  App. 579.   
 
 Lycoming responded to these reports in 1973 with 
Service Bulletin 366 (“SB366”).  SB366 acknowledged that 
“[i]nstances have been reported of leakage through the gasket 
between the bowl assembly and throttle body of the carburetor, 
evidenced by fuel stains in the area of the leak.  Leakage of this 
type is accompanied by loose screws that attach the bowl and 
throttle body.”  App. 567.  Lycoming advised that during 
inspection, the screws should be checked for tightness, and if 
there appeared to be leakage and the screws were loose, the 
bowl should be removed, the gasket should be replaced, and 
the screws should be retightened.3   
 
                                                                
3 Between 2003 and 2008, Lycoming discussed 
internally how to revise SB366.  An updated bulletin 
(“SB366A”) was issued in 2007, again recommending, during 
inspection, to ensure the screws are tight and, if they are loose, 
to replace the gasket and retighten them.   
9 
 Service records show that the problem persisted.  
Owners and mechanics reported to Lycoming loose screws, 
leaking carburetors, and poor engine performance.  In 2004, 
Precision Airmotive LLC (“Precision”), which acquired the 
Marvel-Schebler carburetor line, wrote Lycoming two letters 
regarding the carburetor’s screws and leaking.  As described in 
its first letter, in reviewing the FAA’s service difficulty report 
database, Precision “identified a trend”: “[o]ne of the items that 
has been reported on multiple occasions is loose bowl to body 
attach screws on the MA-4SPA model carburetor,” and “a 
significant percentage of the incidents were on the Cessna 172 
aircraft,” App. 581, the type of aircraft Sikkelee was flying.  
Precision identified no such trends with other carburetor 
models, or with the MA-4SPA on other aircraft.  In its next 
letter, Precision confirmed the same trend and, although 
reports of loose bowl screws had not increased since the 1970s, 
“there continue[d] to be reports of loose screws on certain 
carburetors, particularly those used on O-320 engines in 
Cessna 172 aircraft.”  App. 582.  Precision recommended that 
Lycoming identify the circumstances that allowed screws to 
loosen and “evaluate[ ]” “the pros and cons of a different 
attachment system.”  App. 583.   
 
 The engine in Sikkelee’s plane was in storage until 
1998, when it was installed into the Cessna in accordance with 
the type certificate.4  The engine was removed from the aircraft 
in 2004, after the aircraft was struck by lightning, and 
defendant Triad Aviation, Inc. overhauled the engine.  As part 
of the overhaul, defendants Kelly Aerospace, Inc. and Kelly 
Aerospace Power Systems, Inc. (together, “Kelly”) 
“completely rebuilt or overhauled” the carburetor and shipped 
                                                                
4 Lycoming did not install the engine. 
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it back to Triad for installation.  App. 616.  Kelly held both an 
FAA repair station certificate, which permitted Kelly to 
overhaul Marvin-Schebler carburetors, and a parts 
manufacturer approval (“PMA”) from the FAA, which 
permitted Kelly to manufacture certain carburetor replacement 
parts.  The carburetor was rebuilt with a combination of parts.  
It appears one-half was manufactured by Marvel-Schebler in 
the 1960s and one-half by Marvel-Schebler in the 1970s, and 
Kelly used its own aftermarket parts to join the two 
components.  Kelly performed this work in accordance with 
the service manual and bulletins Lycoming and Precision had 
issued, such as SB366, which recommended that the technician 
detach the two halves of the carburetor, replace the gasket, and 
reassemble the carburetor using new lock tabs.  The carburetor 
as overhauled had the same design as the original carburetor.   
 
 The plane was placed back into service, and in July 
2005, David Sikkelee rented it.  The Cessna crashed shortly 
after takeoff.  David Sikkelee was killed, and his brother, who 
was a passenger, sustained severe injuries but survived.  
Sikkelee asserts that the crash was the result of the carburetor’s 
faulty design for attaching the float bowl and throttle body.  
She alleges that vibrations from the engine loosened the bolts 
holding the float bowl and throttle body together, which 
allowed fuel to leak out of the carburetor into the engine and 
caused the Cessna to crash.   
 
B 
 
 In 2007, Sikkelee filed a wrongful-death and survival 
action against Lycoming, Kelly, and other defendants in the 
United States District Court for the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania.  She asserted several Pennsylvania state-law 
11 
claims, including for strict liability and negligence, and in 
2010, the District Court granted defendants’ motion for 
judgment on the pleadings, holding that her claims fell within 
the preempted field of air safety described in Abdullah v. 
American Airlines, Inc., 181 F.3d 363 (3d Cir. 1999).  Sikkelee 
v. Precision Airmotive Corp., 731 F. Supp. 2d 429 (M.D. Pa. 
2010).  Sikkelee then filed an amended complaint, asserting 
state law claims but incorporating federal standards of care by 
alleging violations of several FAA regulations.  After motion 
practice and settling her claims with Kelly, Sikkelee narrowed 
her claims against Lycoming to strict liability, negligence, and 
failure to warn, relying on 14 C.F.R. § 21.3.  Just before trial, 
the Court expressed concern that the federal standards of care 
did not allow the Court to formulate intelligible or practical 
legal standards.  It ordered Sikkelee to submit further briefing 
on the appropriate standard of care, and subsequently invited 
Lycoming to file a motion for summary judgment.   
 
 The District Court granted Lycoming partial summary 
judgment on the ground that the FAA’s issuance of a type 
certificate for the engine meant that the federal standard of care 
had been satisfied.  The Court denied summary judgment on 
Sikkelee’s failure-to-warn claims, which were based on 
Lycoming’s alleged violation of 14 C.F.R. § 21.3 for failure to 
“report any failure, malfunction, or defect in any product, part, 
process, or article” that Lycoming made.  Sikkelee v. Precision 
Airmotive Corp. (Sikkelee I), 45 F. Supp. 3d 431, 459-60 
(M.D. Pa. 2014).  The District Court certified its order for 
immediate appeal to address “the reach of Abdullah and the 
scope of preemption in the airlines industry.”  Sikkelee II, 822 
F.3d at 687. 
 
12 
 We granted interlocutory review and held field 
preemption does not apply to state-law aircraft products 
liability claims because (1) “the Federal Aviation Act, the 
General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994, and the 
regulations promulgated by the [FAA] reflect that Congress 
did not intend to preempt aircraft products liability claims in a 
categorical way,” id. at 683; (2) “Congress has not created a 
federal standard of care for persons injured by defective 
airplanes,” id. at 696; and (3) “the type certification process 
cannot as a categorical matter displace the need for compliance 
in this context with state standards of care,” id.  Thus, aircraft 
products liability cases like Sikkelee’s may proceed using a 
state standard of care, “subject to traditional principles of 
conflict preemption, including in connection with the 
specifications expressly set forth in a given type certificate.”  
Id. at 683.  We therefore vacated the grant of summary 
judgment in Lycoming’s favor and remanded for further 
proceedings.  Id. at 683, 709.   
 
 Lycoming again moved for summary judgment, 
asserting Sikkelee’s claims are subject to conflict preemption 
and would, in any event, fail under Pennsylvania law.  The 
District Court granted Lycoming’s motions, concluding 
(1) Sikkelee’s claims were conflict preempted because FAA 
regulations made it impossible for Lycoming to unilaterally 
implement the design changes Pennsylvania law allegedly 
would have required, Sikkelee III, 268 F. Supp. 3d at 692-709, 
and (2) there was no genuine dispute of material fact as to 
either her negligence or strict liability claims, id. at 709-15.  
The District Court also reconsidered its earlier summary 
judgment order, Sikkelee I, 45 F. Supp. 3d at 435, and granted 
summary judgment to Lycoming on Sikkelee’s claim that 
13 
Lycoming violated 14 C.F.R. § 21.3.  Sikkelee IV, 2017 WL 
3310953, at *2-3.   
 
 Sikkelee appeals.   
 
II5 
 
A 
 
 We exercise plenary review of the District Court’s 
orders granting summary judgment.  Sikkelee II, 822 F.3d at 
687.  We apply the same standard as the District Court, viewing 
facts and drawing all reasonable inferences in the non-
movant’s favor.  Hugh v. Butler Cty. Family YMCA, 418 F.3d 
265, 266-67 (3d Cir. 2005).  Summary judgment is appropriate 
where “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and 
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 56(a).   
 We also review questions of preemption de novo.  
Sikkelee II, 822 F.3d at 687.  Preemption is an affirmative 
defense on which Lycoming bears the burden of production 
and persuasion.  In re Vehicle Carrier Servs. Antitrust Litig., 
846 F.3d 71, 84 (3d Cir. 2017); El v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 479 
F.3d 232, 237 & n.6 (3d Cir. 2007).   
 
B 
 
 Lycoming asserts Sikkelee’s claims are conflict-
preempted under the doctrine of impossibility preemption 
                                                                
5 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1332(a).  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291.   
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because it “cannot independently do under federal law what 
state law requires.”  Appellee’s Br. at 38.  It also argues that 
Sikkelee’s claims fail as a matter of Pennsylvania law and the 
District Court properly granted summary judgment on her 
§ 21.3 claim.  We will first address Lycoming’s preemption 
defense. 
 
1 
 
 The doctrine of preemption has constitutional roots in 
the Supremacy Clause, which provides that “the Laws of the 
United States . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . any 
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary 
notwithstanding.”  U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.  Congress thus has 
the power to preempt state law.  Arizona v. United States, 567 
U.S. 387, 399 (2012).  We are nevertheless mindful that the 
federal and state governments “possess concurrent 
sovereignty” in some areas.  Sikkelee II, 822 F.3d at 687.  For 
example, we assume “that the historic police powers of the 
States were not to be superseded by [a] [f]ederal [a]ct unless 
that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”  Id. 
(quoting Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009)).  This 
presumption against preemption applies in the context of 
aviation products liability law.  Id. at 690-92, 707-08.   
 
 There are several types of preemption: express and 
implied, and within implied, field and conflict.  Express 
preemption has not been asserted and, in Sikkelee II, we held 
Congress has not preempted the field of state-law design- and 
manufacturing-defect claims concerning aircraft products, id. 
15 
at 683.6  We did not, however, decide whether conflict 
preemption bars Sikkelee’s claims.  See id. at 683, 695, 702, 
709.   
 
 There are two types of conflict preemption: 
(1) impossibility preemption, where compliance with both 
federal and state duties is impossible; and (2) obstacle 
preemption, where compliance with both laws is possible, but 
state law poses an obstacle to the full achievement of federal 
purposes.  In re Vehicle Carrier Servs., 846 F.3d at 84.  
Lycoming argues Sikkelee’s claims are barred under 
impossibility preemption.7  “The question for ‘impossibility’ 
[preemption] is whether the private party could independently 
do under federal law what state law requires of it.”  PLIVA, 
Inc. v. Mensing, 564 U.S. 604, 620 (2011). 
 
                                                                
6 We concluded the Federal Aviation Act and related 
regulations “do not indicate a clear and manifest congressional 
intent to preempt state law products liability claims; Congress 
has not created a federal standard of care for persons injured 
by defective airplanes; and the type certification process 
cannot as a categorical matter displace the need for compliance 
in this context with state standards of care.”  Sikkelee II, 822 
F.3d at 696.  We also held the General Aviation Revitalization 
Act of 1994 (“GARA”), Pub. L. No. 103-298, 108 Stat. 1552 
(codified at 49 U.S.C. § 40101 note), does not express any such 
congressional intent.  Sikkelee II, 822 F.3d at 696-99.     
7 Because preemption is an affirmative defense, we 
examine only the defense asserted before us.  In re Vehicle 
Carrier Servs., 846 F.3d at 84. 
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2 
 
 “Pre-emption analysis requires us to compare federal 
and state law.  We therefore begin by identifying the state tort 
duties and federal . . . requirements applicable to” Lycoming.  
Id. at 611.  Under Pennsylvania law, a seller may be liable in 
strict liability and negligence for injuries caused by its 
defective products.  The test for strict liability is set forth in the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965).  Tincher v. 
Omega Flex, Inc., 104 A.3d 328, 351, 384-433 (Pa. 2014).8  
This requires a plaintiff to prove: “(1) that the product was 
                                                                
8 Section 402A provides: 
(1) One who sells any product in a defective 
condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or 
consumer or to his property is subject to liability 
for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate 
user or consumer, or to his property, if 
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of 
selling such a product, and 
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or 
consumer without substantial change in the 
condition in which it is sold. 
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies 
although 
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in 
the preparation and sale of his product, and 
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the 
product from or entered into any contractual 
relation with the seller. 
 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A.   
17 
defective; (2) that the defect was a proximate cause of the 
plaintiff’s injuries; and (3) that the defect causing the injury 
existed at the time the product left the seller’s hands.”  Pavlik 
v. Lane Ltd./Tobacco Exps. Int’l, 135 F.3d 876, 881 (3d Cir. 
1998) (citing Davis v. Berwind Corp., 690 A.2d 186, 190 (Pa. 
1997)).  A plaintiff may prove a “defective condition” exists 
by showing either “(1) the danger is unknowable and 
unacceptable to the average or ordinary consumer” (the 
“consumer expectations standard”), or “(2) a reasonable 
person would conclude that the probability and seriousness of 
harm caused by the product outweigh the burden or costs of 
taking precautions” (the “risk-utility standard”).  Tincher, 104 
A.3d at 335, 387, 389.   
 
 Pennsylvania law also recognizes a negligence cause of 
action for products liability.  See Tincher, 104 A.3d at 383-84; 
Phillips v. Cricket Lighters, 841 A.2d 1000, 1008 (Pa. 2003).  
To maintain such a claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate “[1] that 
the defendant had a duty to conform to a certain standard of 
conduct; [2] that the defendant breached that duty; [3] that 
such breach caused the injury in question; and [4] actual loss 
or damage.”  Phillips, 841 A.2d at 1008 (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted).    
 
 Sikkelee argues that Lycoming’s design for affixing the 
carburetor parts was defective and that, under Pennsylvania 
law, Lycoming would be liable for failing to use a different 
design.  Specifically, she asserts that Lycoming should have 
used safety wire to secure the bolts that attach the float bowl 
and throttle body.   
18 
3 
 
 We next examine the federal regulations applicable to 
the design of aircraft products.  Congress has imposed federal 
oversight of certain aspects of aviation.  Sikkelee II, 822 F.3d 
at 684.  The 1958 Federal Aviation Act consolidated regulatory 
authority in a single entity, the FAA, and adopted the earlier 
statutory framework for the promulgation of minimum 
standards for design safety and the process for the issuance of 
certificates that indicated compliance with those regulations.  
Id.  Under federal law, an aviation-products manufacturer must 
obtain a type certificate from the FAA.  49 U.S.C. § 44704(a); 
14 C.F.R. § 21.31; Sikkelee II, 822 F.3d at 684.  “[A] type 
certificate . . .  certifies that a new design for an aircraft or 
aircraft part performs properly and meets the safety standards 
defined in aviation regulations, 49 U.S.C. § 44704(a); 14 
C.F.R. § 21.31.”  Sikkelee II, 822 F.3d at 684 (emphasis 
omitted).9  If the FAA determines that a product “is properly 
                                                                
9 The FAA also issues 
 
production certificate[s], which certif[y] that a 
duplicate part produced for a particular plane 
will conform to the design in the type certificate, 
49 U.S.C. § 44704(c); 14 C.F.R. § 21.137.  
Before a new aircraft may legally fly, it must also 
receive . . . an airworthiness certificate, which 
certifies that the plane and its component parts 
conform to its type certificate and are in 
condition for safe operation.  49 U.S.C. 
§§ 44704(d), 44711(a)(1). 
 
Sikkelee II, 822 F.3d at 684 (emphasis omitted).   
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designed and manufactured, performs properly, and meets the 
regulations and minimum standards prescribed under [49 
U.S.C. §] 44701(a),” it issues a type certificate.  Sikkelee II, 
822 F.3d at 684 (alteration in original) (quoting 49 U.S.C. 
§ 44704(a)(1); see also 14 C.F.R. § 21.21.  A type certificate 
includes  
 
the type design, which outlines the detailed 
specifications, dimensions, and materials used 
for a given product; the product’s operating 
limitations; a “certificate data sheet,” which 
denotes the conditions and limitations necessary 
to meet airworthiness requirements; and any 
other conditions or limitations prescribed under 
FAA regulations. 
 
Sikkelee II, 822 F.3d at 684 (citing 14 C.F.R. §§ 21.31, 21.41; 
FAA, Order 8110.4C, change 5, Type Certification, ch. 3-3(a) 
(2011)).  A type certificate remains in effect “until surrendered, 
suspended, revoked, or a termination date is otherwise 
established by the FAA.”  Id. at 685 (quoting 14 C.F.R. 
§ 21.51).   
 
 A manufacturer generally must make the product in 
accordance with that certificate.  A manufacturer may make a 
“minor” change through “a pertinent ‘method acceptable to the 
FAA.’”  Id. (quoting 14 C.F.R. § 21.95).  A minor change “is 
one that has no appreciable effect on the weight, balance, 
structural strength, reliability, operational characteristics, or 
other characteristics affecting the airworthiness of the 
product.”  14 C.F.R. § 21.93(a).  All other changes are “major” 
changes.  Id.; see also Sikkelee II, 822 F.3d at 703 n.21; 14 
C.F.R. pt. 43, app. A (listing major alterations and repairs).  
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Major changes require advance FAA approval and issuance of 
an amended or supplemental type certificate.  49 U.S.C. 
§ 44704(b); Sikkelee II, 822 F.3d at 685, 703 n.21; 14 C.F.R. 
§§ 21.97; FAA Order 8110.4C, change 1, Type Certification, 
ch. 4-1(a), 4-2 (2011).   A DER may approve minor changes 
and, with specific authorization, may approve major changes.  
FAA, Order 8110.37F at 2-2, 4-4; see supra note 2.  
 
 The FAA also regulates aftermarket parts.  A 
manufacturer seeking to make replacement parts generally 
must obtain a PMA, which allows the manufacturer to produce 
replacement parts for use on certificated products.  See 14 
C.F.R. §§ 21.8, 21.9, 21.303(a).  A PMA holder may 
manufacture aftermarket parts, but must do so in accordance 
with the type certificate for the product, and must follow the 
same procedures as the type certificate holder.  14 C.F.R. 
§§ 21.8, 21.9, 21.303(a), 21.319; FAA Order 8120.22A, 
Production Approval Process, ch. 4-5, at 4-7 to 4-8 (2016).  
The manufacturer may obtain a PMA by showing (1) its 
product is identical to the certificated product, through 
evidence of a licensing agreement; (2) its product is identical 
to the certificated product, without a licensing agreement; or 
(3) tests and computations showing that its product meets 
airworthiness requirements.  See 14 C.F.R. § 21.303; FAA, 
Order 8120.22A, 4-7 to 4-8.  The process for changing a PMA 
design is the same as that for certificated designs; changes are 
classified as “major” and “minor,” and major changes must 
receive FAA approval before they can be included in the 
design, while minor changes can be approved using a method 
acceptable to the FAA.  14 C.F.R. § 21.319.  At oral argument, 
the parties agreed that Sikkelee’s proposed change to the 
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carburetor’s design would be a minor change.10  We need not 
decide whether the change would be minor or major because, 
either way, there is no impossibility preemption here.  
 
4 
 
 Lycoming asks us to affirm the District Court’s ruling 
on impossibility preemption because its FAA-approved type 
certificate precludes it from unilaterally changing its design, 
and thus it could not simultaneously comply with federal and 
state law, where state law would require it to adopt a different 
design.  Lycoming relies primarily on PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 
564 U.S. 604 (2011), and Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. 
Bartlett, 570 U.S. 472 (2013).  In contrast, Sikkelee relies on 
the impossibility preemption standard articulated in Wyeth v. 
Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009).  To understand the relevance of 
these cases, some background is required. 
 
 All three of these cases concerned tort claims relating to 
warning labels provided in connection with pharmaceutical 
drugs.  PLIVA and Bartlett involved claims against generic 
drug manufacturers.  Under federal law, a generic drug 
manufacturer may produce a drug that is identical to one made 
by a brand-name manufacturer, but when it receives 
permission to do so, it must use the same FDA-approved 
design and warning labels as the brand-name manufacturer.  
See Bartlett, 570 U.S. at 483-84, 486; PLIVA, 564 U.S. at 612-
13, 612 n.2.  This is because the generic manufacturer is given 
                                                                
 10 Although we disagree with our dissenting colleague’s 
characterization of the concession concerning whether the 
change here would be minor, Dissent at 12, we agree that the 
distinction is irrelevant to the preemption issue before us.   
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the opportunity to market its product without performing the 
same comprehensive testing as the brand-name manufacturer 
performed on its product, with the idea being that such 
examination is not needed if the products and warnings are 
identical.  See, e.g., In re Wellbutrin XL Antitrust Litig. 
Indirect Purchaser Class, 868 F.3d 132, 143-44 (3d Cir. 2017); 
In re Fosamax (Alendronate Sodium) Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. 
II), 751 F.3d 150, 153 (3d Cir. 2014).  Thus, both the products 
and the warnings must be identical.  
 
 PLIVA involved state-law failure-to-warn claims 
against manufacturers of a generic drug.  564 U.S. at 608-09, 
611-12.  Generic drug manufacturers are required, under the 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (the “FDCA”) and FDA 
regulations, to use labels that match those of the brand-name 
manufacturers, and these generic drug manufacturers may not 
“independently chang[e]” their labels.  Id. at 618.  Assuming 
state law required a different label, the Supreme Court 
concluded federal law did not permit the generic company to 
do what state law required—provide a different, stronger label, 
id. at 617-18—and thus, it was impossible for the generic 
company to change the warnings, id. at 618.   
 
 The Supreme Court reached the same conclusion in 
Bartlett, where the manufacturer of a generic drug was sued for 
an alleged design defect.  570 U.S. at 475.  In Bartlett, the Court 
held redesign was not possible because “the FDCA requires a 
generic drug to have the same active ingredients, route of 
administration, dosage form, strength, and labeling as the 
brand-name drug on which it is based.”  Id. at 483-84.  As a 
result, the Court concluded “state-law design-defect claims 
like New Hampshire’s that place a duty on manufacturers to 
render a drug safer by either altering its composition or altering 
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its labeling are in conflict with federal laws that prohibit 
manufacturers from unilaterally altering drug composition or 
labeling.”  Id. at 490.  Thus, in both cases, the state-law claims 
were conflict-preempted because it would be impossible to 
comply with the federally mandated label and the modified 
label purportedly required by state law.  Id. at 486-87, 490; 
PLIVA, 564 U.S. at 618, 624.   
 
 Lycoming argues that it—like the generic drug 
manufacturers in those cases—cannot unilaterally change the 
FAA-approved design in the type certificate without FAA 
approval, and thus, it cannot both comply with federal law and 
do what Sikkelee claims state law requires it to do.  Similarly, 
Lycoming asserts Kelly could not unilaterally alter the 
carburetor’s design because, as a PMA holder, it was obliged 
to follow the design as set forth in Lycoming’s type certificate. 
   
 We are not persuaded.  In PLIVA and Bartlett, the 
defendant generic manufacturers were obligated to use the 
design and labeling of their brand-name counterparts.  
Lycoming is not in that position.  As discussed above, the 
Federal Aviation Act and FAA regulations require FAA 
approval of a type certificate and changes to it.  Lycoming, 
however, is not stuck with the design initially adopted and 
approved in a type certificate.  Indeed, Lycoming has made 
numerous changes to the type certificate for its O-320 engine, 
which the FAA approved in short order.  As to the carburetor 
specifically, Lycoming was in communication with the FAA 
about its design, sought to change the requirement that safety 
wires be used, and obtained FAA permission to use hex screws 
and lock tab washers instead.   
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 This case therefore is more like Wyeth, where the 
preemption defense failed.  In Wyeth, the Supreme Court 
concluded the plaintiff’s state-law failure-to-warn claim 
against a brand-name drug manufacturer was not preempted 
because a “changes being effected [‘CBE’]” regulation 
permitted it to change a label to strengthen a warning upon 
filing a supplemental application with the FDA, and the brand-
name manufacturer did not need to wait for agency approval.  
555 U.S. at 568.  Thus, “absent clear evidence that the FDA 
would not have approved a change to [the drug’s] label, [the 
Court could] not conclude that it was impossible for Wyeth to 
comply with both federal and state requirements.”  Id. at 571.   
 
 The principles of Wyeth apply here.  The nature of FAA 
regulations and Lycoming’s interactions with the FAA—
including the changes it has made to its type certificate—
demonstrate that Lycoming could have—indeed it had—
adjusted its design.  Thus, Lycoming is in a position more akin 
to that of the brand-name manufacturer in Wyeth than that of 
the generic manufacturers in PLIVA and Bartlett, who were 
unable to deviate from the brand-name manufacturers’ labels.11  
                                                                
 11 Our dissenting colleague encourages us to read “the 
Supreme Court’s impossibility decisions in concert,” Dissent 
at 15.  We have done so and have considered how the principles 
in Wyeth, PLIVA, and Bartlett apply to the FAA regulatory 
scheme.  Unlike the generic manufactures in PLIVA and 
Bartlett, who must accept without modification, the brand-
names’ approved design, Lycoming had the freedom to request 
changes to its type certificate to change its design, just like a 
brand-name manufacturer.  Although the FAA does not 
explicitly have a CBE-type process that allows the certificate 
holder to make a change before obtaining approval, the FAA 
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For Lycoming to be entitled to an impossibility-preemption 
defense, it must present “clear evidence that the [FAA] would 
not have approved a change.”  Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 571.12  This 
it cannot do. 
 
 There is no evidence in the record showing that the FAA 
would not have approved a change to the carburetor’s screws 
                                                                
allows the certificate holder to request permission to make a 
minor or major change.   
12 Sikkelee “propose[s] the following rule: When a 
defendant can implement a change or alteration to a design, 
product, or article without first seeking approval from an 
employee of the FAA, a state-law claim requiring that change 
is not preempted unless the defendant proves with clear 
evidence that the FAA would reject the change or alteration.”  
Appellant’s Br. at 22-23, 34.  She thus proposes a rule based 
on approval by an actual employee of the FAA.  Sikkelee 
argues that any DER-approved changes do not involve FAA 
approval because DERs are not FAA employees (and can be 
employees of the manufacturers themselves): “[w]hile the 
DER represents the government, he is emphatically not the 
government, and that defeats impossibility.”  Appellant’s Br. 
at 35; see also id. at 23, 33-36.   
We decline to adopt the rule Sikkelee proposes.  As we 
have noted, see supra n.2, DERs are agents of the FAA, and so 
their involvement does not mean the FAA has not approved a 
design.  Second, to the extent she is arguing FAA approval 
provides no guarantee of safety because the agency delegates 
much of its certification work to DERs, we have rejected that 
argument and noted that the involvement of DERs in the 
certification- and change-approval process alone cannot defeat 
conflict preemption.  Sikkelee II, 822 F.3d at 708. 
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or attachment system.  To the contrary, viewing the record in 
the light most favorable to the nonmovant, it shows that the 
FAA likely would have approved a change, which also would 
have meant Kelly would not have used the same allegedly 
defective design when it overhauled and reinstalled the 
carburetor in 2004.  The FAA was aware, as its correspondence 
with Lycoming shows, that the carburetor’s screws loosened in 
some cases and caused fuel to leak.  As a result, the FAA asked 
Lycoming to review the malfunction or defect service reports 
of loosening screws “and provide comments to this office as to 
any action you may propose that will help in alleviating this 
problem.”  App. 557.  The FAA also reminded Lycoming that 
“Marvel Schebler carburetors are a part of the engine type 
design and are not approved separately.  The type certificate 
holder is responsible for the type design and also the correction 
of service problems.”  App. 579.  This shows that the FAA 
wanted Lycoming to address the situation.  Moreover, the FAA 
had previously required the use of safety wire, the very design 
change Sikkelee alleges would have cured the defect.  Based 
on this record, the FAA likely would have approved a proposed 
change to the attachment system.  Thus, it was not 
“impossible” for Lycoming to change its allegedly defective 
design, and Lycoming’s conflict-preemption defense fails.   
 
 In addition, allowing state-law claims to proceed in this 
context complements, rather than conflicts with, the federal 
scheme.  See Fellner v. Tri-Union Seafoods, L.L.C., 539 F.3d 
237, 249 (3d Cir. 2008) (“[S]tate tort law and other similar state 
remedial actions are often deemed complementary to federal 
regulatory regimes, and this appears to be such a case.”).  
“[T]he regulations are framed in terms of standards to acquire 
FAA approvals and certificates—and not as standards 
governing manufacturing generally,” which indicates “that the 
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acquisition of a type certificate is merely a baseline 
requirement.”  Sikkelee II, 822 F.3d at 694.  Thus, “in the 
manufacturing context, the statutory language indicating that 
these are ‘minimum standards,’ means what it says.”  Id. 
(internal citation omitted) (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 44701).  State-
law claims, such as Sikkelee’s, supplement the federal scheme 
and further its central purpose: safe aircrafts.13   
                                                                
13  The FAA, in its brief submitted to our Court in 
connection with the last appeal, asserts the FAA’s express 
approval of an aircraft or part design would preempt, under 
conflict preemption principles, a plaintiff’s state tort suit 
arguing for an alternative design.  App. 1183.  We noted the 
FAA’s position that “to the extent that the FAA has not made 
an affirmative determination with respect to the challenged 
design aspect, and the agency has left that design aspect to the 
manufacturer’s discretion, the claim would not be preempted.”  
Sikkelee, 822 F.3d at 702 (quoting FAA Letter Br. at 11; App. 
1184).  We concluded: 
 
A type certificate thus would not create such a 
conflict in the FAA’s view where unilateral 
changes are permissible without preapproval or 
where an allegation of negligence arises after the 
issuance of a type certificate, such as claims 
related to . . . issuance of service bulletins to 
correct an issue that has come to the 
manufacturer’s attention . . . . 
 
Id. at 702 n.19 (citing FAA Letter Br. at 10-11, 12-13 n.2; App. 
1183-86).  That is precisely the situation here: Lycoming was 
aware the carburetor’s screws could and did come loose on 
numerous occasions, leading to fuel leaks—in the Cessna 172 
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 Moreover, “immuniz[ing] aircraft and aviation 
component part manufacturers from liability for their defective 
product designs” is “inconsistent with the [Federal Aviation] 
Act and its goal of fostering aviation safety.”  Amicus Am. 
Ass’n for Justice Br. at 4-5.  A manufacturer would have little 
incentive to correct problems with its plane or parts if it could 
rely on a type certificate to avoid liability.  This would 
undermine both the goal of the federal regulatory regime and 
the interests of states in ensuring the safety of their residents.14 
 
 For these reasons, the District Court erred in holding 
Sikkelee’s claims were conflict-preempted and granting 
Lycoming summary judgment on that basis.   
 
                                                                
in particular—and Lycoming issued service bulletins in an 
apparent attempt to address the issue (but did not change the 
design).  Thus, our conclusion that Sikkelee’s claims are not 
preempted is consistent with the FAA’s position on the impact 
of state law on the federal regulatory scheme. 
 14 Our dissenting colleague opines that preemption 
applies because the regulatory scheme does not allow a 
certificate holder to unilaterally make a change, even though 
they could request permission to do so.  Taking this view to its 
logical conclusion means that certificate holders could be 
aware of conditions that threaten safety or airworthiness and 
not be required to take any action to address those conditions.  
This approach would insulate the certificate holder from 
liability and leave those injured without a remedy. 
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C 
 
 We next address Sikkelee’s state-law strict liability and 
negligence claims and conclude Lycoming is not entitled to 
summary judgment on them. 
 
 Sikkelee asserts Lycoming’s engine design is defective, 
Lycoming knew about the problem and failed to correct it, and 
the engine’s defect proximately caused David Sikkelee’s 
death.  She further argues the engine’s condition did not 
substantially change between 1969 and the crash, and any 
changes that did occur were reasonably foreseeable.  She also 
argues that Lycoming is liable for defects in the overhauled 
carburetor because manufacturers can be liable for defects in 
aftermarket parts installed on their products.  Lycoming 
disputes Sikkelee’s arguments as to causation, substantial 
change, foreseeability, and negligence, and argues that it 
cannot be held liable because it was not in the replacement 
carburetor’s chain of distribution.   
 
 The District Court should have permitted Sikkelee’s 
strict liability and negligence claims to be decided by the jury.  
Pennsylvania law provides that whether a product is defective 
“is a question of fact ordinarily submitted for determination to 
the finder of fact; the question is removed from the jury’s 
consideration only where it is clear that reasonable minds could 
not differ on the issue.”  Tincher, 104 A.3d at 335.  Similarly, 
the issues of proximate causation, whether a change to the 
product was substantial, and whether that change was 
reasonably foreseeable, are generally for the jury.  
Merriweather v. E.W. Bliss Co., 636 F.2d 42, 44-45 (3d Cir. 
1980); Hamil v. Bashline, 392 A.2d 1280, 1287-88 (Pa. 1978); 
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D’Antona v. Hampton Grinding Wheel Co., 310 A.2d 307, 310 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1973).   
 
 Here, the record indicates that reasonable minds could 
differ on these issues.  For example, there is a genuine dispute 
of material fact as to causation.  Sikkelee’s experts posit the 
carburetor—due to its loosening screws and fuel leakage—
caused the engine to fail and the plane to crash, while 
Lycoming’s experts dispute Sikkelee’s experts’ conclusions.  
Moreover, contrary to Lycoming’s argument, there are 
circumstances in which a manufacturer can be held liable for a 
component part that caused a plaintiff’s injury, even when the 
part was made by a different entity, and particularly when that 
entity was required to follow the manufacturer’s design.  See 
D’Antona, 310 A.2d at 309-10 (holding that “appellant’s 
averment that a defective condition in [the] machine caused the 
wheel to explode sufficiently states a cause of action against 
[defendant] despite the fact that the explosion occurred in a 
component part manufactured by someone else”); see also 
Pridgen v. Parker Hannifin Corp., 916 A.2d 619, 623 (Pa. 
2007) (“[W]e agree with [plaintiffs’] observation that 
[defendants, including Lycoming] sit at the top of the aviation 
food chain with respect to all components comprising the type 
certificated engine.  Thus, in the absence of GARA repose, 
[defendants] might indeed be liable for design defects in 
replacement parts and/or the aircraft systems within which 
such components function.” (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted)).   
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 Therefore, the District Court erred in granting 
Lycoming summary judgment on Sikkelee’s state-law 
claims.15 
D 
 
 Finally, Sikkelee argues the District Court erred in 
granting Lycoming summary judgment on her failure-to-
notify-the-FAA claim, based on 14 C.F.R. § 21.3.  That 
provision provides that “[t]he holder of a type certificate 
(including amended or supplemental type certificates), a PMA, 
or a TSO [technical standard order] authorization, or the 
licensee of a type certificate must report any failure, 
malfunction, or defect in any product or article manufactured 
by it that it determines has resulted in any of the occurrences 
listed in paragraph (c) of this section.”  14 C.F.R. § 21.3(a).  
Paragraph (c) includes situations that fit the alleged defect and 
carburetor malfunction here.  Id. § 21.3(c)(1)-(2), (6), (10).  
Sikkelee argues Lycoming failed to comply with this 
regulation, and the FAA would have taken corrective action if 
Lycoming had complied.   
 
 Lycoming is entitled to summary judgment on this 
claim.  Sikkelee has attempted to use a federal duty and 
standard of care as the basis for this state-law negligence claim.  
                                                                
15 We note the District Court made repeated reference 
to Sikkelee’s $2 million settlement with Kelly.  Sikkelee III, 
268 F. Supp. 3d at 690, 709, 717.  The settlement with Kelly is 
irrelevant to any of the legal issues presented here, and we hope 
the District Court’s analysis and tone were not influenced by 
it.  See, e.g., id. at 717 (stating that because of this settlement, 
“sympathy for unrealized pecuniary losses is not in order for 
the Plaintiff here”).   
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See Reply Br. at 17 (“Lycoming is liable in negligence for 
failing to report known product defects to the FAA.”).  
However, as we held in Sikkelee II, “Congress has not created 
a federal standard of care for persons injured by defective 
airplanes.”  822 F.3d at 696; cf. Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ 
Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 348, 353 (2001) (holding state-
law fraud-on-the-FDA claims were impliedly preempted by 
federal law, and noting that “were plaintiffs to maintain their 
fraud-on-the-agency claims here, they would not be relying on 
traditional state tort law which had predated the federal 
enactments in question[ ].  On the contrary, the existence of 
these federal enactments is a critical element in their case”).  
The District Court therefore properly granted summary 
judgment to Lycoming on this claim.   
 
III 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the District 
Court’s order granting Lycoming summary judgment on 
Sikkelee’s state-law claims, affirm the Court’s order granting 
Lycoming’s motion for reconsideration on Sikkelee’s failure-
to-warn-the-FAA claim, and remand for further proceedings. 
ROTH, Dissenting in Part 
 
The Majority holds that Sikkelee’s claims against 
Lycoming are not conflict preempted.  Applying the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Wyeth v. Levine,1 the Majority concludes 
that, because Lycoming has not produced clear evidence that 
the FAA would have prevented Lycoming from implementing 
certain design changes to the engine, it was not impossible for 
Lycoming to unilaterally implement the design changes 
allegedly required under Pennsylvania law.   
 
The Majority errs in two key ways.  First, the Majority 
takes a piecemeal approach to the Supreme Court’s 
impossibility preemption precedents, without considering it in 
the aggregate.  Second, the Majority misframes the applicable 
regulatory regime, which requires prior FAA approval for all 
changes, major and minor.   
 
Without disregarding Wyeth, I find that, given the 
nature of the regulatory regime at issue, the Supreme Court’s 
subsequent decisions in PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing2 and Mutual 
Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett3 are controlling.  In short, 
applicable FAA regulations prohibited Lycoming from 
implementing the allegedly required change without some 
form of prior FAA approval.  As a result, under the Supreme 
Court’s conflict preemption precedents, compliance with state 
law would have been impossible.  I therefore respectfully 
                                              
1 555 U.S. 555 (2009). 
2 564 U.S. 604 (2011).   
3 570 U.S. 472 (2013).   
2 
 
dissent from the portion of the Majority opinion that holds 
that Sikkelee’s claims are not conflict preempted.4   
 
I.  
The Majority and all parties to this appeal agree that 
the Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Wyeth, PLIVA, and 
Bartlett set out the governing standards for impossibility 
preemption.  Although the Majority opinion cogently 
summarizes those decisions, it fails to consider their 
combined import.  Together, those decisions present a 
cohesive standard:  when federal regulations prevent a 
manufacturer from altering its product without prior agency 
approval, design defect claims are preempted; when federal 
regulations allow a manufacturer to independently alter its 
product without such prior approval, design defect claims 
ordinarily are not preempted.  Revisiting Wyeth, PLIVA, and 
Bartlett shows why that is the applicable standard.   
 
In Wyeth, the plaintiff suffered serious injury after 
receiving an intravenous administration of the brand-name 
drug Phenergan, through a method known as “IV push.”  The 
drug’s FDA-approved label included a general warning about 
the risks involved in IV administration but did not specifically 
                                              
4 I agree with my colleagues that the District Court correctly 
granted summary judgment in favor of Lycoming on 
Sikkelee’s failure-to-notify-the-FAA claim based on 14 
C.F.R. § 21.3.  I therefore join Part II.D of the Majority 
opinion.  In addition, I reach the question of preemption in 
this Dissent because I agree with my colleagues that there are 
disputed issues of material fact that would preclude summary 
judgment on the merits of Sikkelee’s state-law tort claims.   
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instruct physicians to use the safer “IV drip” method instead 
of the riskier “IV push” method.5  The plaintiff brought state-
law claims for negligence and strict liability against the drug 
maker, Wyeth, premised upon Wyeth’s failure to include on 
the label a more specific warning about the dangers of IV 
push administration.  Wyeth argued that the plaintiff’s claims 
were conflict preempted because the FDA had approved 
Phenergan’s label, and FDA regulations generally forbid drug 
makers from altering an approved label, rendering it 
impossible for Wyeth to comply with its state-law duty to 
enhance the label.  The Supreme Court, however, rejected 
Wyeth’s conflict preemption defense because an exception in 
the FDA regulations, the so-called “changes being effected” 
(CBE) exception,6 allowed drug makers to unilaterally add 
warnings to their labels, subject to the FDA’s authority to 
subsequently rescind or modify such changes.7  Setting out 
the rule now applied by the Majority in this case, the Court 
held that “absent clear evidence that the FDA would not have 
approved a change to Phenergan’s label, we will not conclude 
that it was impossible for Wyeth to comply with both federal 
and state requirements.”8 
 
The Supreme Court returned to conflict preemption 
two years later in PLIVA.9  PLIVA involved a set of facts 
generally similar to those of Wyeth:  Plaintiffs took 
Defendant’s drug, suffered an injury, and brought state-law 
tort claims against Defendant premised upon Defendant’s 
                                              
5 Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 559-60.   
6 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c)(6)(iii).   
7 Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 568-71.  
8 Id. at 571.   
9 564 U.S. 604.   
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failure to include a sufficient warning on the drug’s label.10  
The Court, however, noted a key distinction from Wyeth with 
regard to the applicable federal regulations.  The drug at issue 
in PLIVA was a generic, and FDA regulations required that 
generic drugs bear the exact same warning label as their 
brand-name equivalent.11  The regulations for generic drugs 
included no exception comparable to the CBE provision that 
allowed brand-name makers to unilaterally alter their warning 
label.12  Notably, however, the Court did not find that generic 
drug makers were incapable of ever making their warning 
labels safer.  Instead, relying on the representations of the 
FDA as amicus, the Court assumed that generic drug makers 
“could have proposed—indeed, were required to propose—
stronger warning labels to the [FDA] if they believed such 
warnings were needed” and that “[i]f the FDA had agreed that 
a label change was necessary, it would have worked with the 
brand-name manufacturer to create a new label for both the 
brand-name and generic drug.”13   
 
Despite this duty, the Court concluded that, for 
purposes of conflict preemption, such a regulatory regime 
rendered it impossible for the generic manufacturer to 
simultaneously comply with state tort law and the federal 
regulatory requirement without prior agency approval.  The 
Court explained that “[t]he question for ‘impossibility’ is 
whether the private party could independently do under 
federal law what state law requires of it.”14  There, the drug 
                                              
10 Id. at 609-10.   
11 Id. at 613.   
12 See id. at 614-15.   
13 Id. at 616 (emphasis added).   
14 Id. at 620 (emphasis added).   
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maker could not.  The Court specifically noted that the drug 
maker would not have satisfied its state law duties by 
proposing changes to the label or otherwise engaging in 
dialogue with the FDA.  Rather, “[s]tate law demanded a 
safer label; it did not instruct the Manufacturers to 
communicate with the FDA about the possibility of a safer 
label.”15   
 
PLIVA concludes with a clear standard:  “[W]hen a 
party cannot satisfy its state duties without the Federal 
Government’s special permission and assistance, which is 
dependent on the exercise of judgment by a federal agency, 
that party cannot independently satisfy those state duties for 
pre-emption purposes.”16  In the Supreme Court’s words, 
“Wyeth is not to the contrary.”17  That is so because the CBE 
regulation “applicable to Wyeth allowed the company, of its 
own volition, to strengthen its label in compliance with its 
state tort duty.”18   
 
Finally, in Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett,19 
the Supreme Court reaffirmed and further clarified its conflict 
preemption analysis.  Bartlett, like PLIVA, began as a state-
law tort suit against a generic drug manufacturer whose 
product had injured the plaintiff.   The federal regulatory 
scheme was the same.  The key factual distinction was that, in 
Bartlett, the plaintiff’s state-law claims alleged a design 
                                              
15 Id. at 619.   
16 Id. at 623-24.   
17 Id. at 624. 
18 Id.  
19 570 U.S. 472.   
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defect, not merely a failure to warn.20  The plaintiff argued—
and the First Circuit had held—that such claims were not 
preempted because the drug manufacturer could comply with 
both state and federal law by simply choosing not to make the 
drug at all.21  The Supreme Court rejected this line of 
reasoning.  The Court noted that preemption doctrine 
“presume[s] that an actor seeking to satisfy both his federal- 
and state-law obligations is not required to cease acting 
altogether in order to avoid liability.”22  The Court concluded 
that the drug maker could have satisfied its duty under state 
law only by altering the drug’s composition or its label.  
Because federal regulation did not allow the drug maker to 
implement either of these measures without prior FDA 
approval, the state-law design defect claim was preempted.23   
 
Distilled to their essence, the Supreme Court’s recent 
conflict preemption decisions present a guiding principle:  
When a manufacturer operating in a federally regulated 
industry has a means of altering its product independently and 
without prior agency approval—such as a brand-name drug 
manufacturer who may implement labeling alterations via the 
CBE process—state-law claims against the manufacturer 
alleging a tortious failure to make those alterations ordinarily 
are not preempted; but, when federal regulations prohibit a 
manufacturer from altering its product without prior agency 
approval, state-law claims imposing a duty to make a 
different, safer product are preempted.  Crucially, the 
question is not whether a manufacturer may ever alter its 
                                              
20 Id. at 479.   
21 Id.  
22 Id. at 488.   
23 Id. at 491-92.   
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product under the applicable federal regulatory scheme.  
Rather, the question is whether a manufacturer may do so 
without prior agency approval.  Thus, despite being decided 
after Wyeth, PLIVA and Bartlett are more logically 
understood as setting the general standard for impossibility 
preemption in cases involving an industry subject to thorough 
federal regulation prohibiting independent changes to an 
agency-approved product.  By contrast, the clear evidence 
standard announced in Wyeth applies only if the regulatory 
regime includes an exception, such as the CBE process, 
allowing manufacturers to independently implement design 
changes without prior agency approval.   
 
 The Third Circuit’s recent decision in In re Fosamax24 
reflects a faithful application of this principle.  Fosamax, like 
Wyeth, was a state-law action against a brand-name drug 
maker who could have unilaterally updated its warning label 
by availing itself of the CBE exception.  Applying Wyeth, the 
Third Circuit held that “the mere availability of a CBE label 
amendment” could, but “would not always[,] defeat a 
manufacturer’s preemption defense, because the FDA retains 
authority to reject labeling changes.”25  The Court concluded 
that “where there is ‘clear evidence that the FDA would not 
have approved a change’ to the label, federal law preempts 
state-law claims premised on the manufacturer’s failure to 
make that change.”26  Because the drug maker could have 
                                              
24 In re Fosamax (Alendronate Sodium) Prods. Liab. Litig., 
852 F.3d 268 (3d Cir. 2017), cert. granted sub nom. Merck 
Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Albrecht, No. 17-290, 2018 WL 
3148288 (U.S. June 28, 2018).   
25 Id. at 283.   
26 Id. (quoting Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 571).   
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unilaterally implemented labeling changes via the CBE 
exception and had not offered clear evidence that the FDA 
would have subsequently rejected the proposed label 
amendment, this Court held that the drug maker’s 
impossibility preemption defense failed.  Accordingly, 
Fosamax is entirely consistent with the core principle we 
derive from Wyeth, PLIVA, and Bartlett.   
 
II. 
With the Supreme Court’s impossibility preemption 
framework squarely in focus, I turn to the applicable federal 
regulatory regime, which prohibited Lycoming from making 
changes to its engine without first obtaining FAA approval.  
The Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (the Act)27 established the 
FAA and empowered it to promulgate and enforce safety 
regulations in the field of civil aeronautics.  Thus, FAA 
regulations and the Act itself prescribe the operative safety 
standards for the manufacture of airplanes and their 
components, including aircraft engines.  For an aircraft 
engine manufacturer who wishes to produce a particular 
model of engine, the first step in the regulatory process is 
obtaining a “type certificate” from the FAA to confirm 
compliance with applicable safety standards.28  With limited 
exceptions not applicable here, a manufacturer cannot 
produce an aircraft engine unless a type certificate for that 
specific engine design has been obtained by the manufacturer 
or an entity with whom the manufacturer has a licensing 
agreement.29  When applying for a type certificate, an engine 
                                              
27 Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731.   
28 See 49 U.S.C. § 44704(a); 14 C.F.R. § 21.21.   
29 See 14 C.F.R. § 21.6.   
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manufacturer is required to submit, among other things, “a 
description of the engine design features, the engine operating 
characteristics, and the proposed engine operating 
limitations,”30 as well as “the type design, test reports, and 
computations necessary to show that the product to be 
certificated [sic] meets the applicable airworthiness . . . 
requirements.”31  The “type design” portion of the application 
“outlines the detailed specifications, dimensions, and 
materials used for a given product.”32  This Court has 
previously described the type certification process as 
“intensive and painstaking.”33  The issuance of a type 
certificate by the FAA represents the FAA’s “find[ing] that 
the . . . aircraft engine . . . is properly designed and 
manufactured, performs properly, and meets the regulations 
and minimum standards prescribed under [the Act].”34    
 
As the Majority acknowledges, once the FAA has 
approved a particular engine design and issued a type 
certificate, the engine manufacturer must continue to 
manufacture the engine in compliance with the type 
certificate.35  The manufacturer may not make changes to the 
engine design without FAA approval.36  Federal regulations 
                                              
30 14 C.F.R. § 21.15.   
31 14 C.F.R. § 21.21(b).   
32 Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive Corp., 822 F.3d 680, 684 
(3d Cir. 2016).   
33 Id.    
34 49 U.S.C. § 44704(a)(1).   
35 Maj. Op. at 19.   
36 See 14 C.F.R. §§ 21.95, 21.97 (requiring FAA approval for 
both minor and major changes).   
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divide possible changes to an engine model into two 
categories: “major changes” and “minor changes.”37   
 
A minor change is “one that has no appreciable effect 
on the weight, balance, structural strength, reliability, 
operational characteristics, or other characteristics affecting 
the airworthiness of the product,”38 and thus “may be 
approved under a method acceptable to the FAA.”39  One of 
these methods is to receive approval from an individual 
engineering expert who has been certified by the FAA as a 
Designated Engineering Representative (DER).  DERs may 
be hired by a manufacturer, but their authority to approve 
minor changes exists solely as the result of a delegation of 
authority by the FAA, as allowed under the Act.40  DERs act 
“within limits prescribed by and under the general 
supervision of the [FAA] Administrator,”41 and their 
decisions may be appealed to the Administrator or 
reconsidered by the Administrator at his or her own 
initiative.42  As the Majority correctly notes, “DERs are 
agents of the FAA, and so their involvement does not mean 
the FAA has not approved a design.”43  Accordingly, DER 
approval is a form of FAA approval.  Although the applicable 
regulations, including the availability of DERs, provide 
manufacturers with flexibility when seeking to implement 
minor changes, neither federal regulations nor any other 
                                              
37 14 C.F.R. § 21.93.   
38 Id.  
39 14 C.F.R. § 21.95.   
40 See 49 U.S.C. § 44702(d).   
41 14 C.F.R. § 183.29.   
42 49 U.S.C. § 44702(d)(3).  
43 Maj. Op. at 25 n.12.   
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authority cited by the Majority or by Sikkelee supports the 
conclusion that a manufacturer may actually implement a 
minor change prior to receiving FAA approval.44   
 
All changes that are not minor are classified as 
major.45  A manufacturer seeking to implement a major 
change must first obtain a new or supplemental type 
certificate from the FAA.46  A manufacturer applying for 
approval of a major change must “[p]rovide substantiating 
data and necessary descriptive data for inclusion in the type 
design” and must show that the proposed change complies 
with all FAA regulations.47  As such, it is clear that major 
changes require prior FAA approval.  Aside from major and 
minor changes, FAA regulations provide no other means 
through which an original manufacturer can implement 
changes to the design of a type certified product.48  In other 
words, in the field of safety regulation of civil aeronautics, 
there is no CBE process for a manufacturer to effect changes 
to a type certificate prior to FAA approval of that change. 
                                              
44 Sikkelee argues that prior DER approval provides 
manufacturers with such an avenue, because DER approval is 
not actually FAA approval.  Appellant’s Br. at 33.  As noted 
above, all three members of this Panel reject that argument.   
45 14 C.F.R. § 21.93.   
46 14 C.F.R. § 21.113.   
47 14 C.F.R. § 21.97.   
48 As correctly summarized in the Majority opinion, 
additional FAA regulations govern changes to airplane parts 
made by aftermarket parts manufacturers who hold an FAA-
issued PMA.  Maj. Op. at 20.  These regulations are not 
directly applicable to an original manufacturer such as 
Lycoming.   
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Moreover, concerning major versus minor changes, the 
Majority asserts that, at oral argument, both parties agreed 
that Sikkelee’s proposed change to the carburetor would be a 
minor change. 49   In fact, the parties were not in such perfect 
agreement.  Lycoming’s precise position at oral argument was 
that, while Lycoming viewed the proposed change as having 
no impact on airworthiness and thus as minor, Sikkelee’s 
theory of tort liability inherently required the conclusion that 
the change was major.50  I find Lycoming’s argument 
persuasive and note the inherent tension in Sikkelee’s 
position that a proposed change could have prevented the 
crash but, at the same time, should be considered minor, i.e., 
having no impact on airworthiness.  However, the question 
need not be resolved.  Sikkelee’s claims are preempted 
regardless of whether the proposed change is classified as 
minor or major because, as we have explained, both processes 
require prior FAA approval before they are implemented.   
 
III. 
As a result of this comprehensive regulatory scheme, 
Sikkelee’s strict liability and negligence claims against 
Lycoming are conflict preempted.  Lycoming, as the original 
manufacturer of and type certificate holder for the O-320-
D2C engine (the Engine), had two paths through which it 
could lawfully implement changes to the Engine’s design:  
the minor change process for changes having no appreciable 
                                              
49 Maj. Op. at 20-21.     
50 See Oral Arg. Audio Recording at 32:25-48, available at 
http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/oralargument/audio/17 
3006_Sikkeleev.Precision-Airmotive.mp3.       
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impact on the airworthiness of the Engine, or the major 
change process for all other changes.  As outlined above, both 
paths would have required prior FAA approval before 
Lycoming could implement a proposed change.  No exception 
akin to the CBE process in Wyeth applied here.  Accordingly, 
the regulatory regime places this case squarely in the realm of 
PLIVA and Bartlett.   
 
That result is readily apparent when we consider the 
question of impossibility in the precise language provided by 
the Supreme Court:  Could Lycoming independently do under 
federal law what state law required of it,51 i.e., alter the design 
of the carburetor’s fastening mechanism from lock-tab 
washers to safety wire?  Under the applicable FAA 
regulations, the answer to that fundamental question is clearly 
no, regardless of whether such a change would have been 
minor or major.  PLIVA and Bartlett instruct that that answer 
is sufficient to find conflict between Lycoming’s state and 
federal duties, and thus to create impossibility preemption.  
We must go no further.  We should not inquire into the 
likelihood that the FAA might have approved a proposed 
change.52    
The Majority disagrees, finding that Wyeth provides 
the applicable standard and that we must thus consider 
                                              
51 Cf. PLIVA, 564 U.S. at 620.   
52 PLIVA, 564 U.S. at 623 (“[P]re-emption analysis should 
not involve speculation about ways in which federal agency 
and third-party actions could potentially reconcile federal 
duties with conflicting state duties.  When the ‘ordinary 
meaning’ of federal law blocks a private party from 
independently accomplishing what state law requires, that 
party has established pre-emption.”).   
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whether Lycoming offered sufficient evidence that the FAA 
would have rejected the proposed change.  But, in support of 
its application of Wyeth, the Majority fails to identify any 
provision in the federal regulations that would have allowed 
Lycoming to independently implement the proposed change 
without prior FAA approval.  Quite the contrary, the Majority 
candidly acknowledges that the FAA does not have a CBE-
type process.53  That should be the end of our Wyeth inquiry.  
But instead, the Majority relies on “the nature of FAA 
regulations and Lycoming’s interactions with the FAA” to 
support its conclusion that Lycoming “could have . . . 
adjusted its design” and that Wyeth’s standard should thus 
apply.54  In particular, the Majority points out that Lycoming 
has amended its type certificate for the O-320 engine a 
number of times over the years and that Lycoming had been 
“in communication with the FAA” about the carburetor 
design and reports of loose bolts.55   
 
 I take no issue with those statements to the extent that 
they are simply factual assertions.56  But the Majority errs in 
concluding that those facts establish that Wyeth alone supplies 
the applicable standard for conflict preemption analysis in 
this case.  Reading the Supreme Court’s impossibility 
preemption decisions in concert, the key initial question for 
impossibility is not whether a manufacturer has engaged in 
                                              
53 Maj. Op. at 24 n.11.   
54 Maj. Op. at 24.  
55 Maj. Op. at 23.  
56 It bears noting that nothing in the record suggests these 
amendments occurred without prior FAA approval.  See J.A. 
561.  See also J.A. 559-61 re list of applications for and 
revised type certificates issued by FAA for the Engine. 
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dialogue with a federal agency regarding possible design 
changes or even whether the agency might ultimately approve 
a proposed change at the conclusion of such dialogue.  
Rather, as previously stated, we must start with the question 
whether the manufacturer could have implemented the change 
independently, i.e., without prior agency approval.  This issue 
was, in fact, addressed in PLIVA, where the Supreme Court 
expressly contemplated whether a preemption defense was 
foreclosed by the type of manufacturer-agency dialogue that 
the Majority now relies upon.  There, the Court assumed that 
a generic drug maker had a duty to warn the FDA of safety 
problems and could have proposed and asked the FDA to 
approve a new warning label for both the generic and brand-
name drug.57  But that fact did not defeat preemption or even 
trigger the Wyeth inquiry because the manufacturer still could 
not independently implement the proposed change without 
prior agency approval.58  The case here is similar.  
 
Likewise, the Majority may well be correct that “the 
FAA wanted Lycoming to address the situation”59 of 
loosening bolts in the Engine’s carburetor.  But that alone 
does not negate impossibility, because nothing in the record 
or FAA regulations suggests that Lycoming could have 
implemented any design changes without prior FAA 
approval.  On the contrary, the natural reading of the 
regulations is that FAA approval is required for any change, 
major or minor.60  In fact, it would be logical to infer that 
Lycoming and the FAA engaged in dialogue about bolt 
                                              
57 PLIVA, 564 U.S. at 616-17.   
58 Id. at 619-20.   
59 Maj. Op. at 26.   
60 See supra section II.   
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loosening precisely because both parties recognized that FAA 
approval would be required before Lycoming could 
implement any remedial design change.  That Lycoming “has 
made numerous changes to the type certificate for its O-320 
engine”61 also does not alter the impossibility analysis.  As 
outlined above, changes to a type certificate, whether minor 
or major, require prior FAA approval, and the record reflects 
such approval for the other changes that Lycoming made.62   
 
Ultimately, although this case involves a detailed 
regulatory regime governing a complex industry, the correct 
result of this appeal is dictated by a few key facts.  Under 
FAA regulations, Lycoming, as the original manufacturer of 
and type certificate holder for the Engine, had two means of 
implementing changes to its design—the major change 
process and the minor change process.  The plain language of 
the regulations and the record in this case show that, under 
either process, some form of FAA approval would have been 
required before Lycoming could have implemented the design 
change proposed by Sikkelee.  Thus, the answer to the 
fundamental question of impossibility preemption—could 
Lycoming independently do under federal law what state law 
allegedly required of it—is clearly no.  The Supreme Court 
instructs that such an answer supports a finding of 
impossibility preemption and requires that our inquiry go no 
further.   
 
                                              
61 Maj. Op. at 23. 
62 J.A. 559-61 (Type Certificate Data Sheet No. E-274) 
(listing applications for and issuance of new or revised type 
certificates for O-320 engine models between 1952 and 
2003).   
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IV. 
For the reasons stated above, I conclude that the 
Majority has erred by relying upon Wyeth in isolation and by 
expanding its inquiry to consider whether Lycoming 
presented clear evidence that the FAA would not have 
approved the design change now proposed by Sikkelee.  FAA 
regulations prohibited Lycoming from independently 
implementing changes to the design of the Engine without 
prior FAA approval.  As such, pursuant to PLIVA and 
Bartlett, Lycoming has established a valid impossibility 
preemption defense.  I therefore respectfully dissent in part 
from the Majority opinion and would affirm the judgment of 
the District Court.   
 
